• My topic is materiality and how ideas on materiality from my field-STS, science and technology studies-might cross over into management and organisation studies.
So the paradigm shift I have in mind moves in a non-dualist direction by emphasising performance rather than will and representation and cognition, and by recognising that performance densely and constitutively enmeshes us in the world rather than splitting us off from it. To throw in some more words, the dualist social sciences are 'humanist' in the sense that they find their explanatory variables exclusively in the human and social world, while the perspective that I associate with STS is instead 'posthumanist,' decentring the human and foregrounding instead nondualist couplings of people and things.
If you want an image to hang onto, look at the jade sculpture shown in fig. 1 . At the bottom right you can see some small figures, and in other places you can see traces of human constructions-an archway in the middle; a stairway towards the top. But these are minor parts of the overall composition, not the key elements of it: the trees, mountains and clouds are much more powerful and striking, and the people nestle amongst them. The vision here is of humanity as just a part of a larger world, and this sort of vision is, I would say, a necessary condition for finding questions of materiality and space, the concrete substrate of our being, interesting. And then we can note that this little sculpture is not Western. It is Chinese; it exemplifies what I think of as a Taoist ontology, not a Cartesian one. And to stay with the East, for a small but perspicuous example of how we are plugged into the larger social world, we could think about bonsai trees ( fig. 2) . In an obvious sense, keeping a bonsai tree is itself a decentred dance of agency, between the tree-a nonhuman agentwhich continually grows new shoots in unpredictable places and directions, and a human paris-rev-030812.doc p. 3 20/8/12 agent who reacts to that, trimming the shoots here and there in pursuit of an emergent aesthetic, and so on, back and forth between the human and the nonhuman. Bonsai, then, can be a model for how we exist in the world in general, and this points us in one direction to the posthumanist analysis of a dense performative engagement with the world, and in the other to Taoism again, with its nonmodern understanding of the world as endless decentred flows, transformations and becomings.
FIGURE 2: BONSAI TREE. Credit: Jane Flaxington
But isn't Taoism one of those premodern philosophies that the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment were supposed to have demolished? This turn to the East, which I want to take seriously, is a marker of the price to be paid for throwing in your lot with posthumanist STS. I think the Taoists got it right about how the world is, and we modern Cartesians have got it wrong. Li (2012) . The crossover centres on the common focus on practice and performance (rather than cognition and epistemology), a decentring of humanity and the recognition of change as a fundamental ontological category. There is also a mismatch, inasmuch as traditional Chinese philosophy adds to this basic picture notions of Yin and Yang and a series of pictures, the finite series of trigrams and hexagrams of the I Ching used in the interpretation of change (Blofeld 1991) . These additional elements are themselves integral to traditional Chinese thought, though I am unable to find a place for them in my own analysis. (Huxley 1956 ; see also Lilly 1972 , Geiger 2003 , Pickering 2010 .
Examples like these help us to see that far from being a stable given, the human self is itself materially produced and engineered. But one qualification is important. course, a sort of dualist separation from the world, but it depends, nevertheless, on all sorts of non-dualist material couplings. The gambling machine itself-an automated slot machine-is crucial. Nothing would happen without it. But many more levels of tuning are also involved.
The gamblers learn to put paper cups on adjacent seats to keep other human beings away, and stick tooth-picks in the mechanism so that one gambling episode follows automatically from another. And from the other side, engineers endlessly tinker with the hardware and software to help the gamblers entrain themselves to the machines more effectively. The machines are equipped to make possible drink orders and cash withdrawals without human intervention; the software becomes adaptive, speeding up or slowing down play in response to the revealed preferences of the gambler.
I can make two observations on this example and then we can move on. One is that gambling machines have a dual function: they are the pathway for gamblers into the zone, and, at the same time, they plug the gamblers into the circuits of capital. This inner/outer connection is probably always a feature of technologies of the self. The Stoic's inner stability goes with the role of ruler of the outer, political, state. Inner calm and non-violent political protest hang together with meditation as the pivot. Explorations of consciousness were integral to the counterculture as a distinctive form of life. So matter here can be seen as helping to constitute both specific selves and the specific social structures with which they hang together.
Second, the gambling example (like bonsai) points to the concept of emergence. As I said, the machine causes nothing; it is not the explanation of the gambler's behaviour. Instead, the gambler has to find out out how to use the machine in practice, how to tune themselves into it.
Likewise, the machines, and the engineers behind them, have to find out how to use the gambler. Nothing in this trajectory of coupled findings-out is given in advance. It is emergent in the brutal sense of not being predictable or even explicable in terms of independent variables. And just like the coupling of people and things, emergence is something which is hard for the western imagination to take in. The shadow of the Cartesian machine still hangs over the social sciences. To find any inspiration for thinking about such processes you would have to look elsewhere: to biological notions of co-evolution, say, or further afield, to eastern philosophy-the Taoist image, again, of the world as a place of endless decentred becomings.
• We can leave the self behind and move from the micro to the macro and think about technoscience, the coupling of science, industry and the economy that we take for granted paris-rev-030812.doc p. 6 20/8/12
today and that seems to be the last hope of the west. As is well known, one of the first important examples of technoscience dates back to the second half of the 19th century and the dye industry: a whole series of synthetic dyes were discovered which were the foundation of a new industry and a new sort of chemistry, and the new industry and the new science grew together as a new sort of scientific/industrial assemblage (Pickering 2005, forthcoming) . The story is too rich to get into here, but I do want to suggest that it is, in a way, isomorphous with what I just said about technologies of the self.
We can start by noting the obvious. As Thomas Pynchon wrote in Gravity 's Rainbow (1975) , 'If you want to know the truth, you have to look into the heart of certain molecules'; the synthetic dye industry was absolutely dependent on emergent properties of matter, on how matter turned out to perform. The key event was the discovery of the dye called mauve, by
William Henry Perkin in London in 1849, and the key point to note is that Perkin was not trying to produce a dye at all. He wanted to synthesise the antimalarial drug quinine, and it just so happened that when he mixed certain chemicals and processed them in a certain way he arrived at a substance that could dye cloth a pretty colour. Here again then we find brutal emergence in the domain of matter, something completely unpredictable in advance that was immensely consequential for human history. And similar emergent material phenomena marked the whole history of this industry. It was important, for example, that mauve was not alone. Experimenting with different chemicals, chemists succeeded in synthesising an everexpanding list of coloured substances that could serve as dyes. Emergent material phenomena here were absolutely central to the emergence of the world we live in now.
At the same time, it is important to think how these substances were drawn into the human world, and especially how they were transplanted from the laboratory into chemical factories.
Scaling up their production proved to be non-trivial. Attempts to do so were dogged by explosions and the destruction of lives and property. Again, we would have to say that it just so happened that Perkin and others found ways to more or less safely scale up the process, cooling the reactants to prevent explosive boiling. They could have failed in this negotiation with the emergent properties of matter, and technoscientific dye production might never have happened. This is a point that has interested me a lot recently. A century and a half after and the like which would make no sense without a recognition of the performative agency of matter that they try to keep in check, an attempt which necessarily, I would say, fails from time to time. Our entire world is built on this sort of chancy engagement with the material world. We live on performative islands of stability (Pickering 2011a So again we have the image of co-evolution, now of matter and knowledge, with fields of emergent material properties and scientific representations growing together, like biological species constituting environments for one another or like gamblers and gambling machines, or humans and bonsai trees. And I should, of course, throw in the social here, too. One way into this is to ask about the role of capitalism in this whole story. Certainly the mauve synthesis only counted as an emergent property of matter in a world where textiles and textile-dying were already major industries, so could we not say that capital was the cause of all that followed? In a way, I think we could. But not in the sense that capital was a cause that somehow contained subsequent events within itself (as the collision of two snooker balls determines their later trajectories). Nothing was predictable here. Just as Perkin had to find out how to scale up the mauve synthesis, so capital had to find out how to latch onto it, in a process that emergently transformed the social landscape and capital itself. New links had to be set up between producers of raw materials (coal miners instead of farmers) to dyers. In the 1880s, science was itself built into capital for the first time, in the shape of a new social institution, the industrial research laboratory, now enfolded within the body of industry (on organsiational 'enfolding' see also Pickering 1995b). New career paths appeared for academically trained chemists; universities changed form to foster these, especially in Germany. Patent law was also renegotiated to turn chemical syntheses into revenue streams, and so on. So, if capital was a cause, it was also at stake and emergently transformed here, mutating like the evolutionary becoming of a strange plant or animal in history in its entanglements with the powers of nature and our knowledge of them-not any sort of independent exogenous controller of events. Capital lives and becomes in the thick of things, just like digital gamblers and academic scientists.
• I have so far been offering a sort of detached analysis of technologies of the self and of technoscientific production, exploring ways that materiality intertwines with the human and the social. This is a standard academic project, the kind of thing that most of us do most of the What was, or is, cybernetics? The name comes from kybernetes, the Greek word for steersman, and you could think of cybernetics as the science of steering. But we can go a step further. Cybernetics is about steering something like a sailboat, and the art of sailing is a performative one, of getting along with the wind, currents and the way water flows round the hull, by leaning one way or the other, putting on more or less sail, tightening the rigging or paris-rev-030812.doc p. 9 20/8/12
loosening it a bit, and so on. So cybernetics understands steering as a continual decentred, performative, emergent dance of agency, as I would say, between the human and the nonhuman, the sailor, the boat, the wind and the sea. It thus shares the Taoist and posthumanist ontology that I have been talking about all along. More importantly, however, the cyberneticians put this vision to work in real-world projects.
The man who did most to translate the basic cybernetic image into management was Stafford Beer (1926 Beer ( -2002 , the founder of what he called management cybernetics (Beer 1959) . And
Beer's central objective was precisely to transform management to thematise and foreground dances of agency-dense, performative, open-ended interactions-between the internal elements of an organisation and between the organisation and its environment. The cybernetic organisation would continually find out how the environment reacted to it (buying more or less of its products, say) and then react to that, adapting itself to whatever emerged, and so on and so on, back and forth. And this was what led Beer and his friend Gordon Pask to an interest in biological computing, as it was called (Pickering 2009a ).
Beer's project in the late 1950s was to take the automation of the factory beyond production and into management. Especially he wanted to automate the dances of agency that he understood to be crucial to management. The idea was to construct adaptive systems to take the place of managers in running organisations. Beer thought first of using computers, but To that end, he experimented with a whole range of systems to find out what might work best, including colonies of insects and mice, and he even got his own children to play a game that found solutions to coupled mathematical equations performatively rather than cognitively.
Much of this work focussed on pond ecosystems. Pull the humans out of the factory, plug in a pond instead, was the idea, and the pond, the factory and the business environment could engage in dances of agency, sometimes finding situations of relatively stable equilibrium, but also capable of transforming the factory itself and its products into a new and better adapted form.
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I have three comments on this work. First, I just want to say that biological computing is one of the most imaginative and visionary projects I have ever come across in the history of science, technology and organisations-so wild! Second, we should note that it depends on taking matter and its agency very seriously; you would never imagine such a project unless you had the sense of steering a ship in a world that performs in unpredictable ways.
Cybernetic management and biological computing were, then, reflexive to posthumanist STS-they played out a posthumanist ontology; they were in the same paradigmatic spacein much the same way as the management of English universities, with their fantasy of collecting power in a few individuals, is reflexive to standard, humanist social theory. This is the important general point here. As well as opening up new perspectives on existing forms of organisation and management, posthumanism helps us to see that radically different forms are possible and interesting; it can function as a radically transformative resource within organisations as well as offering a new and distinctive angle from which to examine them.
My third comment is, of course, that, sadly, biological computing never quite worked.
Organisations today are not managed by ponds or colonies of mice. Beer's project ended in the early 60s. But not, I want to stress, on any point of principle; rather, on the practical difficulty of getting biological systems to care about us. In one experiment, for example, Beer induced pond insects, Daphnia, to ingest iron filings, so that applied magnetic fields representing key industrial variables would constitute the environment to which they adapted.
The Daphnia, however, just excreted the iron, creating a rusty brown medium impervious to the fields-this mode of coupling just did not work. The crowning achievement of the biological computing project was to grow a body of electrochemical threads that developed a new sense-namely, an ability to respond to specific sounds: an ear! (Cariani 1993 
FIGURE 3: CONTROL SYSTEMS IN (A) THE HUMAN BODY, (B) THE FIRM.
Source: Beer (1981, 131, figs 22 and 23) . This is a further sense in which cybernetic management is reflexive to posthumanist theory.
The VSM was the basis for all of Beer's consultancy work and has many followers in management today, but I can note that the most ambitious application of it was forty years ago now, to the entire Chilean economy under the socialist regime of Salvador Allende in the early 70s. Project Cybersyn, as it was called, went a long way in a couple of years before it was cut off by the Pinochet coup.
One further aspect of the VSM is worth discussing here. As I said, Beer insisted that internal relations within the organisation should themselves have the form of a performative dance of agency. This is the significance of the reciprocating arrows linking systems 3 and 4 in fig 4. paris-rev-030812.doc p. 12 20/8/12
The relation between levels was supposed to be a process of 'reciprocal vetoing would happen if they talked openly to one another-something which, again. would never happen in my university. As a consultant, Beer developed a more structured approach to decentred decision-making in a process he called Syntegration (Beer 1994) . Syntegration is a complex process of many iterations, usually extended over several days, but the basic idea is to assign participants to the edges of a notional icosahedron, and to organise a process of sequential discussions between the parties whose edges end at a common vertex, alternating in steps between the vertices at the end of each edge. In this way arguments can progressively echo all around the icosahedron, eventually taking an emergent form controlled by no-one in particular.
Syntegrations have been performed on many topics, running from the reorganisation of the British OR Society (of which Beer was President) up to Israeli-Palestinian relations and world peace, and they continue to be held today. And one further observation is relevant here.
Syntegration does depend on some simple material technologies-recording and circulating the outcomes of different phases of discussion-and also on the control of spacesystematically putting groups of people together and keeping others apart. But the process is primarily representational and linguistic-it is talk. Nevertheless, it is talk which is Though I have not mentioned it before, the VSM has a recursive structure (fig 4) , so that within any system 1, say, is nested a whole replica of the VSM, and this goes on up and down the scale forever. And Beer understood this in terms of a great chain of being stretching upwards from biological cells to the cosmos. Syntegration, in turn, was envisaged as giving rise to a genuine group mind, again located on a spectrum running from the yogic chakras up to a transcendental unity with the divine. And Beer himself lived out these understandings.
After Chile, he spent half of each year in Toronto working as a management consultant and the other half living in a primitive stone cottage in Wales where he taught tantric yoga. In Beer's cybernetics, then, the mundane and the spiritual ran continuously into one another, rather than being assigned to separate ontological realms.
What can we say about this? I was surprised when I first found spiritual threads like these running all through the history of cybernetics. Now, I am not (Pickering 2011b 
